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ARGUMENT 
Respondents1 brief in this case has raised a few new issues 
and arguments to which this reply brief will respond. It should 
be noted at the outset that there is no dispute over what law to 
apply to the case; the dispute is over the application of that 
law to this particular case. The Respondents have attempted to 
argue that Petitioner is not entitled to unemployment benefits 
under either the "good cause" standard for a voluntary termina-
tion of employment or under the "equity and good conscience" 
standard. As the following will show their arguments are without 
merit. 
GOOD CAUSE 
Respondents argued that Petitioner did not have good cause 
for leaving her employment because the record did not support the 
contention that she would have suffered actual or potential 
economic hardship by remaining at her job. Respondents justified 
this claim by stating that Petitioner was not delinquent on her 
bill payments at the time she terminated her employment, so no 
actual economic harm had occurred, and that she did not know how 
much money her husband would be able to send herr so that no 
potential economic harm could be demonstrated. Respondents have 
misunderstood the meanings of the words "actual" and "potential." 
Actual harm is not harm that is occurring at this very moment; it 
is harm that is certain to occur. Petitioner demonstrated that 
she would suffer actual harm by remaining at her employment be-
cause she would receive no money at all from her husband for at 
1 
least one month and probably a minimum of two months. She t 
faced an immediate actual shortfall of $500.00 per month betw 
her income and her expenses, and a certainty that in a short t 
she would be delinquent on her financial obligations. She a 
faced potential economic harm because it was likely, although 
certain, that the amount her husband would be able to send 
would not cover the shortfall between her income and her famil 
expenses. She did not know how much her husband would be able 
send because neither she nor her husband had any idea how h 
his expenses would be every month; but the potential was gr 
that he would not be able to send as much as $500.00. Potent 
harm is not harm that can be demonstrated to a certainty; it 
harm that has some likelihood of occurring. Such harm was c 
tainly present in this case. 
Respondents also claim that Petitioner did not have g 
cause for her termination because she did not remain employed 
use two weeks of accumulated vacation time to look for a job 
New Mexico. This claim overlooks three facts: first, Petitio 
faced an absolute deadline for leaving Salt Lake City; she had 
move before her husband left for the service. Remain 
nominally employed but on annual leave for her last two we 
would have served no purpose. Second, Petitioner will not 
paid unemployment for the first two weeks after her terminat 
because she was paid for her vacation time; for unemployment p 
poses her status for those two weeks is the same as if she 
been still employed and on vacation. Finally, and perhaps m 
importantly, Petitioner had to give a monthfs notice to ] 
employer before she left her employment. She did so (Record, p. 
39) , and thus demonstrated that she was a responsible employee. 
She should not be punished for that responsible act; adopting 
Respondents' requirement that she remain employed until the very 
end, even exhausting her vacation time before she terminated her 
employmentr would do so. 
EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE 
Respondents argued that denying benefits to Petitioner would 
not be against equity and good conscience. The bases for that 
claim are stated on pages 18 and 19 of Respondents' brief. Those 
bases are not supported by the facts of the case. Respondents 
state that Petitioner chose to give up assured income for certain 
unemployment. On the contrary, Petitioner had no choice; the in-
come from her job was suddenly, through no fault of her own, in-
sufficient to meet her family's expenses. She had to either in-
crease her income or decrease the expenses, or both. She could 
not increase her income sufficiently in Salt Lake City (Record, 
p. 42) , so she was forced to leave her employment and move in 
with her in-laws, who would support her and her children while 
she looked for work. 
Respondents also stated that Petitioner chose to move her 
family from a greater job market to an area where fewer jobs were 
available non the mere rumor that wages were higher." That 
statement fails to consider that the main reason for the move to 
New Mexico was the fact that Petitioner could no longer support 
her family in Salt Lake City and moving allowed her to reduce the 
family's expenses to virtually zero. By moving she was able to 
prevent economic hardship to her family. She had no choice I 
to do so. 
Respondents argue that the fact that Petitioner has souc 
employment in fast food restaurants somehow demonstrates tl 
Petitioner's actions were not reasonable. In reality that f< 
shows how committed Petitioner is to remaining in the work for< 
The wages from such a job would not have been sufficient to al! 
the family to move out of the home of Petitioners1 in-laws, 1 
it would have helped support the family and kept it somewl 
independent. 
Finally, Respondents claim that Petitioner did not sea 
for work for "several" weeks and imply that she did not have 
good reason for her actions. The Record shows the following: 
April 5th Petitioner worked her last day at her job in Salt L 
City (p. 38). By the week of April 20th, two weeks later, 
was searching for employment in the Crownpoint area; at the he 
ing she indicated that this was her "first week" (p.40). It 
reasonable to assume that she spent the days between the 6th 
the 20th packing the family's belongings, moving to New Mexi 
and unpacking. To accomplish those tasks in only two weeks is 
achievement indeed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has stated several times that the Employm 
Security Act "is not designed to provide benefits to those 
will not work,8' but "it is to be liberally construed and 
ministered to assist those who are attached to the work force 
need a bridge between jobs." Chagman v. Industrial Commissi.on 
fltali, 700 p.2d 1099 at 1102 (1985); Salt Lake City Cory, v. 
Department of Employment Security, 657 p.2d 1312 at 1317 (1982). 
Respondents would ignore this mandate and adopt a crabbed inter-
pretation of the Act to deny Petitioner the bridge she needed* 
Such an interpretation would not be fair under the circumstances 
of this case and is not supported by the record. The record 
shows that Petitioner was forced to leave her employment because 
she and her family faced actual and potential economic harm if 
she remained at her job, and that she is still very much con-
nected to the work force. Faced with that fact, she had good 
cause to end her employment and her actions were reasonable. 
Petitioner is entitled to unemployment benefits under either the 
"good cause" standard or the "equity and good conscience" 
standard. 
Paul Fyfe 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DNA-People's Legal Services 
P.O. Box 116 
Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313 
